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Exploring the Transition Phase in Offshore Outsourcing:  
Decision Making amidst Knowledge at Risk 
 
    
 Abstract   
We explore the transition phase in information system (IS) offshore outsourcing, focusing on 
ongoing decisions made in a client-vendor arrangement and the implications these decisions have 
for knowledge at risk. Drawing on time-compression and knowledge at risk literatures we argue 
that firms will need to make ongoing transitional decisions over time as knowledge intensive 
work is increasingly handed over from client to vendor. We conduct a longitudinal exploratory 
case study of a strategic development project transitioned from a European client to a company 
in India over a 4-year period. Analysis indicates: (1) four distinct phases of the transition: 
penetration, embedment, ramp-up and stabilization; (2) how transitional decisions and 
knowledge at risk vary across these phases. Results from the longitudinal approach have 
implications not only for understanding the ‘what’ and ‘how’ in IS offshore outsourcing but also 
for a deeper insight into the ‘when’ question. 
 
 
Keywords:  Offshore outsourcing; transitional decisions; knowledge at risk; India; longitudinal 
case study  
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Exploring the Transition Phase in Offshore Outsourcing:  
Decision Making amidst Knowledge at Risk 
 
 
Introduction 
Information systems (IS) offshore outsourcing has become an important source of advantage for 
companies that seek to become - and remain - competitive in the globalized economy. In order 
for IS offshore outsourcing to be effective from locations such as India, it is essential that 
knowledge is transferred from the onshore client organization (hereafter ‘client’) to the offshore 
vendor firm (hereafter ‘vendor’). Because the vendor initially lacks client-specific experience 
(Aydin et al., 2010; Lacity and Rottman, 2009), this transfer is needed to enable vendors to 
contribute to productivity gains for clients (Chang and Gurbaxani, 2012). According to Beulen et 
al. (2011), offshore outsourcing involves the transfer of organization-specific knowledge 
regarding processes and procedures from the client to the vendor, in addition to technology-
specific knowledge. Mechanisms such as onshore placements of vendor staff, as well as formal 
training in client systems and processes, are necessary because they enable vendor staff to 
understand the client and work in the best interests of the client (Williams, 2011). 
Scholars have noted how this knowledge transfer has an important temporal component, 
a sequential learning process that entails ongoing decisions to increase or decrease the proportion 
of activities relocated over time (Maskell et al., 2007; Niazi et al., 2016). Consequently, scholars 
in the IS field have begun to study characteristics of the transition period in which these 
decisions are made (Beulen et al., 2011; Kotlarsky, Scarbrough and Oshri, 2014; Tiwari, 2009). 
In the current study we define the transition period as the period of time in which knowledge and 
capabilities are handed over to a vendor firm in order for the vendor firm to perform for the 
client. The transition period starts immediately after the contract is signed between client and 
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vendor (Tiwari, 2009) and sets the initial conditions for building sustainable high-performing 
teams, able, ultimately, to contribute to innovation and quality as well as to implement cost-
savings for clients (Beulen et al., 2011). The transition period sets the stage for the overall 
success of the relationship between client and vendor.  
In the current study, we examine the transition period from the perspective of ‘knowledge 
at risk’ and the need for ongoing decision making throughout the transition period to manage 
knowledge at risk. The knowledge at risk perspective addresses situations in which knowledge 
becomes a liability or a risk. In the context of offshore outsourcing, knowledge at risk relates to 
situations which can lead to actual knowledge loss and suboptimal performance of the offshore 
outsourcing arrangement, such knowledge being related to the core competences and skills that 
fundamentally contribute to the client’s competitive advantage (Ahmad et al., 2014).  
Research has highlighted the consequences of knowledge at risk in offshore outsourcing, 
which can include loss of client productivity (Ahmad et al., 2014), reduced client 
competitiveness (Hoecht and Trott, 2006b) and poor responsiveness to market changes (Bhali 
and Rivard, 2005; Gewald and Dibbern, 2009). Nevertheless, our literature review revealed that, 
even though IT outsourcing (ITO) risks have been studied in depth (Liang et al., 2016), there has 
been little research to date on ongoing decisions made in offshore outsourcing transitions to 
manage knowledge at risk. Lacity and Willcocks (1997, 1998) conducted some of the earliest 
research in the field, highlighting competences that organizations need to develop in order to 
succeed in IS sourcing. Comprehensive literature reviews (Chadee and Raman, 2009; Lacity et 
al., 2009, 2016) point to knowledge transfer and knowledge retention as “perennial, prickly, 
future challenges” (Lacity et al., 2009, p. 142) and have called for more research from the vendor 
perspective, especially vendors from less-developed countries (Lacity et al., 2016).  
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Additionally, there has been little research on the subject of knowledge at risk within the 
context of client – vendor arrangements during the transition period. This period is crucial to the 
overall success of offshore outsourcing but is considered the most challenging (Kotlarsky et al., 
2014). Furthermore, the academic attention it has received is limited in terms of the depth it goes 
into within the transition phase and the extent to which it deals with knowledge at risk (Beulen et 
al. 2011; Kotlarsky et al., 2014; Tiwari, 2009). For instance, Kotlarsky et al. (2014) viewed the 
transition period in terms of three ‘waves’; a wave being defined in advance within the overall 
project plan as a group of applications to be transitioned from client to vendor. Tiwari (2009) 
developed a three-phase transition period process model for offshore outsourcing (familiarize – 
adapt – accelerate), but did not explicitly capture knowledge at risk over time. 
We address these limitations in the current paper by exploring knowledge at risk over the 
time period in which knowledge-intensive work is increasingly ‘handed over’ from a client firm 
to a vendor firm in India following the signing of an offshore outsourcing contract. Our central 
question is stated as: how does the transition period in an offshore outsourcing arrangement 
unfold in terms of ongoing decision making and the management of knowledge at risk? Drawing 
on insights from time-compression diseconomies theory (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002; Cool et al., 2012) - which suggests that an 
organization will be better off if it spreads learning efforts over a longer period of time instead of 
compressing it into a short period - we argue that it is not only an issue of knowledge transfer 
over distance that can impact the performance of an offshore outsourcing arrangement, but also 
an issue of knowledge transfer over time. We conduct a longitudinal exploratory case study, 
analyzing 181 weekly project status reports that were recorded by a software development team 
in a vendor firm for use by both the client and the vendor, and augment this with insights from 
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the engineers and managers involved. Such reports are a useful source of information on the 
ongoing decisions made as the transition progresses; they provide valuable insight into how 
knowledge transfer decisions are compressed over time. Using this approach, we respond to 
recent calls to study knowledge transfer as a long-term process (Liang et al., 2016; Park et al., 
2011) and we also bring a dynamic angle to the subject of decision-making amidst knowledge at 
risk within the context of offshore outsourcing.  
There are two key areas of findings. Firstly, the case analysis reveals four distinct phases 
of an offshore outsourcing transition, which we label: penetration, embedment, ramp-up and 
stabilization. These phases describe the chronological structure during which decisions relating 
to knowledge ‘hand over’ from the client to the vendor are made. We locate a ‘ramp-up’ point 
after which all IS activity for the project is performed by the vendor in India. We note this 
resembles a “go-stop” cycle as caused by absorption constraints within time compression 
diseconomies theory (Cool et al., 2012). While the presence of such a point in time is found in 
prior studies (Kotlarsky et al., 2014; Tiwari, 2009), our findings differ from these studies 
because, in our case, the precise point in time was not planned at the outset, and it appears to be 
associated with a dramatic reduction in knowledge at risk. Secondly, we identify how the client 
firm’s knowledge at risk and the subsequent decisions to adjust the proportion of work sent 
offshore vary across the phases during the four-year transition period. Findings suggest the 
highest level of absorption constraints (Cool et al., 2012) occur during the embedment phase, 
prior to a ‘ramp-up point’. This embedment phase is a critical period of time in which the vendor 
is most restricted in terms of its ability to process an increasing volume and complexity of client 
requests. Only when this is under control do we see the vendor’s decision to accept and execute 
the ‘ramp-up’. While this has some similarities with Tiwari’s (2009) description of adapt and 
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accelerate phases, our findings differ as the timescales involved in our study ran into years as 
opposed to months, and also we highlight the risk to clients prior to ramp-up. 
Our analysis contributes to the literature on knowledge transfer and decision-making in 
offshore outsourcing. We provide new insight into how time is structured during transition by 
getting inside the transition phase itself and allowing hard project status data to inform our 
understanding of the reality of transition. We add to the literature on the temporal nature of 
offshore outsourcing transitions by showing how knowledge at risk and ongoing decisions 
change over time. By focusing specifically on the time dimension, we extend the work of 
previous scholars who have examined knowledge management risks (Trkman and Desouza, 
2012; Marabelli and Newell, 2012), including work in international offshore outsourcing from a 
distance perspective (Niazi et al., 2016). In this sense, our study advances understanding of 
decision-making in offshore outsourcing by arguing that ongoing decisions to address knowledge 
at risk are a key feature of the phenomenon and are dynamically evolving as a result of the 
interactions and learning between teams spread out over vast distances. It also extends work in 
the field of knowledge management that has emphasized the need for ongoing flexibility in 
knowledge management arrangements (Pan and Leidner, 2003; Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007), 
as well as answering calls to examine new issues surrounding the processes involved in 
knowledge management with IS research in the 21st century (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). 
Furthermore, the present study provides support for the use of time compression diseconomies 
theory in the analysis of knowledge-related phenomena and client-vendor transitions within 
offshore outsourcing, something that prior research into offshore outsourcing has not done.  
 
 
8 
 
Knowledge Transfer and Knowledge at Risk in Offshore Outsourcing 
The study of knowledge transfer has received immense attention in the academic literature (e.g., 
Argote and Ingram, 2000; Argote et al., 2003; Bae and Koo, 2008). Scholars have investigated 
knowledge transfer from various angles, including the role played by the context in which 
knowledge is transferred (Tsai, 2001; Wathne et al., 1996), the perspective of knowledge taken 
(practice versus structural/cognitive) (Marabelli and Newell, 2012), the role of the individuals 
involved (Levin and Cross, 2004; Bae and Koo, 2008), the role of information technology (Pan 
and Leidner, 2003), the nature of knowledge (Simonin, 1999), and the role of ‘fit’ between 
context, units (such as individuals, groups and organizations), and the nature of the knowledge 
(Argote et al., 2003). Ko et al. (2005) described how, while there have been many definitions of 
knowledge transfer, there has been consensus that knowledge transfer occurs when knowledge is 
shared (by a sender) and utilized (by a recipient). In other words, knowledge transfer describes 
the process “through which one unit (e.g. group, department, or division) is affected by the 
experience of another” (Argote and Ingram, 2000, p. 151).  
While much of the literature portrays the benefits of knowledge transfer, scholars also 
have highlighted problematic aspects, such as reduction in competitiveness that one party (the 
‘sender’) can suffer as a result of a decision to transfer knowledge (Trkman and Desouza, 2012; 
Brunold and Durst, 2012; Edvardsson and Durst, 2014). Others have highlighted how, once 
knowledge has been transferred, both sending and receiving parties may suffer from a loss of 
knowledge (Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007), disrupting business operations (Alaranta and 
Martela, 2012). Scholars recently have lamented that the study of the downsides of knowledge 
transfer represents a rather neglected field of investigation (Trkman and Desouza, 2012; Jiang et 
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al., 2013) despite the fact that eminent scholars in the field earlier described the transfer of 
knowledge involving people as one of the most challenging (Argote and Ingram, 2000).  
Knowledge at risk in the context of offshore outsourcing is present when there are 
situations that lead to actual knowledge loss and suboptimal performance of the client-vendor 
arrangement, with a potential erosion of the client’s competitiveness (Ahmad et al., 2014). This 
is worrisome in offshore outsourcing; the sender shares but the receiver does not properly 
internalize and/or utilize the knowledge in the way the sender intended (Martinez-Noya et al., 
2013; Williams, 2011). This puts the client in a vulnerable position because the knowledge 
transferred might become obsolete and no longer nurtured (Bustinza et al., 2010; Mahmoodzadeh 
et al., 2009). Clients face the prospect that capabilities and knowledge may be lost as a 
consequence of transitioning work to an offshore outsourcing vendor (O’Donoghue and 
Croasdell, 2009; Martinez-Noya et al., 2013;). In such situations, the strategic decision to engage 
in offshore outsourcing may even be challenged: what once was a knowledge asset becomes a 
knowledge liability.  
It is also possible these risks will be heightened in situations where clients and vendors 
happen also to be competitors (for example if they are engaged in co-opetition). In situations 
where clients and vendors are not competing for the same customers and where the IT operations 
being outsourced are not strategically important, risks will be lower. Risks will also depend on 
the scope of outsourcing, for example, determined by whether only maintenance is outsourced or 
whether full system development is outsourced as well. Furthermore, differences in languages, 
nation and organizational cultures, time-zones, laws and legal systems as well as vendor 
opportunism supported by geographic distance (Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007; Cheng et al., 
2016) can in combination contribute to the occurrence of knowledge at risk.  
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Table 1 provides a summary of key contributions with regard to the knowledge at risk 
perspective as found in the offshore outsourcing literature. As illustrated in Table 1, the literature 
gives insight into important ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions relating to knowledge transfer and 
knowledge at risk in offshore outsourcing. However, we note that there is a lack of insight in the 
knowledge at risk literature on how time is treated in analysis of offshore outsourcing transition, 
i.e., the ‘when’ question and the timing of decisions throughout the transition period. Conversely, 
scholars that have studied the transition period in offshore outsourcing have not engaged with the 
knowledge at risk perspective in any depth. Kotlarsky et al.’s (2014) analysis of transition was at 
a slightly higher level as it looked at groups of applications transitioned in waves in a pre-
planned manner. This study stressed the impact of knowledge boundaries on codification in 
environments such as offshore-outsourcing. Tiwari’s (2009) process model of offshore 
outsourcing transition had three phases: familiarize, adapt and accelerate and did highlight 
challenges such as limited availability of experts, lack of motivation and application of 
appropriate knowledge transfer tracking tools dedicated to knowledge transfer. However, there 
was not explicit treatment of knowledge at risk. 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 1 HERE *** 
 
Raising the ‘When’ Question: Time Compression and Absorption Constraints in Offshore 
Outsourcing 
Most literature on knowledge transfer between clients and offshore vendors within offshoring 
relationships highlights various forms of distance as a cause of knowledge at risk (e.g., Avison 
and Banks, 2008; Beulen et al., 2005; Cheng et al., 2016; Chua and Pan, 2008; Henley, 2006; 
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Mishra and Mahanty, 2016; Niazi et al., 2016; Youngdahl and Ramaswamy, 2008). The recently 
emerging transition literature suggests there is an alternative perspective related to the timing of 
ongoing decisions (i.e., the ‘when’ question) that has not received adequate attention. A vendor 
may not be able to respond effectively to new client requests because it has not had sufficient 
time to accumulate and internalize client knowledge and develop the capabilities needed to deal 
with the requests (Tiwari, 2009). Underlying this are decisions made by clients and vendors 
working together relating to task volume (where the vendor’s capacity is full and work needs to 
be prioritized) and task complexity (the vendor needs additional training and capability 
development to fulfill the task). Consequently, the phenomenon of time-compression in offshore 
outsourcing raises an alternative way of understanding outcomes in this context. 
We argue that clients can be put in a vulnerable position because of the effects of time-
compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989): the pace in which decisions are made to 
attempt to transfer knowledge to vendors and draw on vendors in search of superior 
performance. If vendors are not ready or able to absorb new knowledge from the client (e.g., 
because they lack business knowledge of the client), then productivity will suffer (Mishra and 
Mahanty, 2016). According to theory of time-compression diseconomies, people are limited in 
their ability to learn quickly (Simon, 1959; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). It takes time for 
people and teams to learn, to assimilate their new experiences and grasp what worked and what 
did not work well (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Dierickx and Cool (1989) argued that the stock 
of assets in a firm is acquired gradually – or accumulated - over time (reputations take time to 
build, know-how takes time to develop and nurture).  
We can apply this reasoning to knowledge transfer within offshore outsourcing: 
Absorptive capacity - the ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and 
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apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) - in a vendor team is developed over 
time. Consequently, the ability of a vendor team to absorb and utilize new client knowledge – 
which is a resource accumulation process - is bounded by time. Cool et al. (2012) discussed time 
dependency of resource accumulation in terms of three characteristics: productivity (the rate of 
producing a certain output), cycle time (the overall time to produce an offering that will be 
accepted by a client), and absorption constraints (limits to the bandwidth that firms have for 
handling new projects). While increases in productivity and reductions in cycle time may bring 
products to market earlier, absorption constraints reduce firms’ ability to deliver because there 
will be limits to how firms can learn and apply new knowledge under time pressure. High speed 
can have a detrimental impact on successful outcomes in unpredictable environments (Chen et 
al., 2012).  
Collectively, these studies suggest that reaching an optimal performance in an offshore 
outsourced arrangement will not be trivial or possible to achieve ‘overnight’. Client-specific 
knowledge such as contextual business knowledge (awareness of the client’s overall business 
strategy, external competitive environment, existing and planned products and services, internal 
organizational structure), as well as project specific specialist knowledge – such as system 
architecture in software development (Williams, 2011), all get transferred over time, not just 
over distance. Decisions to transfer client knowledge to vendors at greater speed can face 
resistance and possible performance problems because of vendor absorption constraints. 
Furthermore, as offshore outsourcing projects differ in terms of their characteristics and 
goals, issues relating to project transitions are likely to differ among project teams (Kedia and 
Lahiri, 2007), even within a single client – vendor relationship. Offshore outsourcing contracts 
between client and vendor firms are underpinned by discrete projects involving the formation of 
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new teams, staffed partly from the client firm, and partly from the vendor firm (Lacity and 
Rottman, 2009). Knowledge at risk at team level occurs when a client team’s expectations of 
vendor team performance exceed the reality of what the vendor team can do. A client team’s 
knowledge is at risk in this situation because it would have gone through the process – over time 
- of articulating tacit knowledge for new requirements and requests in the expectation that the 
vendor team will be able to work on them, only for work on such requests to be put on hold or 
delayed. At some future point when the vendor team is able to process and deliver on the request, 
the assumptions underlying the requirement may have changed, key personnel on the client side 
may have left the team as a consequence of downsizing, and vendor personnel that understood 
the client situation at the time the request was made may have moved on to new projects in other 
teams. It is also possible that the competitive forces in the client’s industry have changed such 
that the specification of the original request has become ‘out of date’. In essence, the delay 
caused by the vendor team’s absorption constraints puts the client in a vulnerable position and its 
knowledge at risk.   
 
Ongoing Decisions within an Offshore Outsourcing Transition 
The literature review on knowledge at risk and time compression diseconomies suggests a 
number of key decisions need to be made by the client –with support and input from the vendor – 
during an offshore outsourcing transition. The four areas identified here assume two important 
decisions have already been made. These are: (1) to engage in offshore outsourcing for a specific 
project / system development activity, and (2) to use a specific vendor in an offshore location for 
this work (Chadee and Raman, 2009; Liang et al., 2016). However, subsequent decisions will 
still need to be made on an ongoing basis, relating to: (1) the evolving role that the client-side 
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onshore team will have in transition governance (Aydin et al., 2010; Beulen et al., 2011; Lacity 
and Rottman, 2008; Mishra and Mahanty, 2016; Tiwari, 2016); (2) the evolving role that the 
vendor-side offshore team will have (Mishra and Mahanty, 2016; Williams, 2011); (3) relational 
governance and how the client and vendor teams will interact and share knowledge, in particular, 
how much rotation of vendor staff between offshore and onshore locations will take place in 
order to overcome communications challenges (Lacity et al., 2009; Niazi at al., 2016; 
Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007; Williams, 2011); (4) the lead person(s) in the vendor team 
responsible for overseeing knowledge absorption of the vendor team as well as ongoing 
allocation of tasks offshore (Chang and Gurbaxani, 2012; Liang et al., 2016; Niazi at al., 2016). 
The literature suggests that ongoing decisions in these areas will be needed to manage 
knowledge at risk and help ensure an optimum outcome from the original decision to enter into 
the offshore outsourcing arrangement. A vendor’s suboptimal performance may be due to a 
variety of factors, including lack of absorptive capacity, insufficient time to process information, 
new and inexperienced team members joining the team, and language and translation issues. 
Knowledge at risk that emerges as a result of this is not truly captured by prior knowledge at risk 
literature (Table 1) and is the focus of our exploratory empirical work. 
 
Methodology 
We conducted a longitudinal exploratory case study to explore ongoing decision making and 
knowledge at risk during the transition of an IS development project that required knowledge to 
be transferred from a client project team in Europe to an offshore vendor project team in India. 
The case study approach is ideal due to the process nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Buchanan, 2012; Eisenhardt, 1989; Niazi at al., 2016; Tiwari, 2009; Willcocks et 
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al., 1999) and our interest in decisions that could put knowledge at risk as a result of time-
compression and absorption constraints. The data was triangulated (Yin, 2009) and included (1) 
archival records (Bryman, 2012) in the form of project status reports – this was the principal data 
source and gave us insight into the severity of knowledge at risk over time; (2) written comments 
we received from five vendor engineers and a client project manager – providing insight into 
ongoing decisions and why knowledge at risk changed when it did; and (3) additional 
information from the vendor on offshore team composition and leadership – providing additional 
insight into ongoing decisions on how the vendor coped with the evolving situation. This mix of 
qualitative and quantitative data sources allowed us to illuminate the central construct (Welch, 
Rumyantseva and Hewerdine, 2016), in this case of knowledge at risk in the context of IS 
offshore outsourcing. The assumptions behind our data coding and analysis are given below and 
the limitations highlighted in the Discussion section. 
The client firm was an international information services and consulting company with 
annual sales greater than $1B. The vendor firm was an Indian provider of IT services with over 
40,000 employees. The client and vendor companies were not competitors in the same industry 
space and had 3 years of experience of cooperation in other projects. Access was established 
through professional contacts to identify a client engagement manager working for the vendor 
firm. This manager provided access to one discrete team in the vendor company that had been set 
up to service a new contract with the client. In other words, this was a new project for the 
vendor. The project was of strategic importance for the client as it enabled the client to generate 
substantial revenues from multiple countries. The scope of work involved all software 
development, testing and ongoing maintenance. At the outset of the project the goal was stated as 
being all development work conducted by the vendor in India and for all client employees and 
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onshore contractors utilized in coding and testing work to be re-deployed or made redundant in 
order to save costs. The point in time at which all development work was to be conducted by the 
vendor team was not explicitly defined at the outset. The reason for this was the expectation for 
growing client demands (new work requests) on the combined team. The challenge was therefore 
twofold: (1) continue to deliver software development service at a high standard, while (2) 
transitioning the project to the vendor in India. Support arrangements were part of the wider 
service level agreement at company level and were not covered in the current analysis. 
 
Data Collection 
The main source of data we used was the archival records in the form of anonymized project 
status reports recorded by the vendor team at weekly intervals over a four-year period. This 
approach follows a stream of research in the field of offshore outsourcing using the offshore 
vendor as a source for data collection (Rajkumar and Mani, 2001; Williams, 2011). In their 
literature review, Gonzalez et al. (2006) observed a growth in research into global outsourcing 
from the perspective of the vendor, although at levels lower than research conducted from the 
perspective of the client. We also note that other researchers in the IS field have analyzed links 
between project status reports and various aspects of business risk. For instance, Beeson et al. 
(2002) documented the process of project status report production, highlighting the role that this 
process plays in allowing IS projects to continually adjust in dynamic business environments. 
According to Aubry (2011), a project status report is an artefact of the project management 
function, a common deliverable that results from multiple information paths and “rich networks 
crossing many boundaries” (p. 442) in the organization. Furthermore, “a project status report is a 
means by which the state of health and performance is communicated to those involved” (Aubry 
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2011, p. 443). In our case, parties from both sides referred to the reports during ongoing project 
management.  
There are multiple advantages of using project status reports for our research. Firstly, the 
status reports provide chronological structure to the phenomenon over a longer period of time 
than we would have been able to capture through alternative sources. We could not be present in 
both onshore and offshore locations over four years (either as direct or participant observers) as 
transition decisions were made. Interviews suffer from recall bias (Yin, 2009) and can be 
problematic in settings such in this one, where key personnel frequently rotate in and between 
organizations or even leave the organizations, and are often difficult to trace (Quan and Cha, 
2010). Secondly, the project status reports started from a point in time shortly after the initial 
contract had been signed but before offshore resources were used for software coding work, 
meaning our data starts right at the beginning of the transition period (Beulen et al., 2011). 
Thirdly, project status reports enabled us to reveal temporal patterns during the transition period, 
something that has evaded scholars to date (Lee, 2012). Fourthly, project status reports are 
important documents in offshore outsourcing, required by client project managers for 
transparency on progress and delays in the transfer and uptake of work in the vendor location 
(Lacity and Rottman, 2008).  
 We also triangulated this data with additional information from the vendor relating to the 
composition of the offshore team. There were two important pieces of information here. The first 
was the overall size of the team, allowing us to calculate the percentage of the combined client-
vendor team that was offshore. The second was the characteristics of the person who was leading 
the offshore team. Both of these sets of variables were found in prior literature to change over 
time (Tiwari, 2009). Additionally, we also collected: (1) textual written comments from key 
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vendor staff on their perception of knowledge transfer with the client over time; (2) textual 
written comments from a client project manager on his/her observations of the different phases 
of the transition that emerged from our analysis of the project status report data. 
 
Data Coding and Analysis 
We obtained 181 status reports, each of which was date-stamped and contained details of IS 
work packages. There were multiple work packages to each status report. Each work package 
had a unique tracking number and was a discrete unit of work with a specified deliverable or 
programming change to be carried out by the vendor team. Each work package represented a 
decision to codify knowledge articulating the business justification for the software development 
request as well as the technical specification and testing plans. Work packages therefore 
contained proprietary, private and confidential information (Currie et al., 2008; Raiborn et al., 
2009; Ahmad et al., 2014), commercially sensitive information (Hoecht and Trott, 2006a), 
knowledge of how systems underpin business strategy (Beeson et al., 2002), and knowledge of 
the client’s critical resources and IP (Quélin and Duhamel, 2003; Hoecht and Trott, 2006b). In 
essence, work package information represents important decisions made by the client firm in 
terms of ‘what’ is transitioned to the vendor and ‘when’ this transition is to take place.  
As summarized in Table 1, scholars have shown how this type of information can 
become a liability for the client in circumstances such as purposeful acts of betrayal and 
accidental disclosure (Baccara, 2007; Hoecht and Trott, 2006b). In our case, we are particularly 
interested in how time-compression diseconomies and attempts to transfer explicit knowledge 
encapsulated in work packages over time can put this knowledge at risk. We therefore used the 
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project status reports to assess changes in the pattern of work packages processed by the offshore 
vendor team chronologically.  
We used the following mechanism to assess the pattern of work over time. In agreement 
with the client, the work packages on each status report were recorded by the vendor team in 
three categories: (1) planned work packages in a given week that have been discussed and agreed 
by the vendor team to be completed by the specified date, (2) completed work packages in a 
given week, (3) open items (work packages requested by the client but unable to be fulfilled by 
the vendor). We counted the number of work packages in these three categories for each week of 
data we obtained. We also recorded changes in the vendor team leader, extent of staff rotations 
(from offshore to onshore), and the percentage split between onshore client and offshore vendor 
personnel. There were 29 weekly reports that were not provided. Through discussions with 
vendor representatives, we learned these were immaterial – most were not produced (e.g., over 
holiday periods) or were merged with other reports. The effect of these missing values was 
managed in two ways: (1) t-tests and ANOVA-tests across phases treated sufficiently large sub-
groups of the dataset to reduce the impact of a small number of missing weeks per sub-group, (2) 
eight week moving averages for key variables were plotted in order to smooth the effect of peaks 
and troughs in work package counts to reduce the effect of missing weeks when visualizing the 
longitudinal data. 
We assessed client knowledge at risk in the following way. Our literature review 
suggested two basic scenarios in which it is possible to assess the client’s knowledge at risk once 
a contract between client and vendor is put into force. Firstly, there is a scenario in which 
knowledge transferred by the client to the vendor is effective and sufficient to enable the vendor 
to deliver work activities as required and as planned. There is low knowledge at risk in this 
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scenario as the client is achieving what it set out to achieve as guided by the contract with the 
vendor.  Secondly, the literature suggested a scenario in which the attempt at transfer by the 
client is insufficient in itself to enable the vendor to deliver work activities as required by the 
client. Knowledge has been shared but not yet internalized and utilized by the vendor (e.g., 
Mishra and Mahanty, 2016). The client intends for certain work to be carried out by the vendor 
that the vendor is unable to deliver. We found support from this in comments from the vendor 
side:  
“I work within an offshore unit in India and the most challenging part here is knowledge 
transition as most of the documents sent by the client are in [non-English language]. We do have 
an in-house translation team but overall this language barrier costs us more time and efforts 
than I was used to at my previous employer (which primarily served to US based clients).” (a 
vendor engineer) 
 
Building on these two scenarios, we assume that with low numbers of open items, and a 
balance (i.e., equal split) between numbers of planned and completed tasks, there is low 
knowledge at risk. The vendor team is performing as expected and in-line with contractual 
obligations. In this scenario, it is reasonable to assume that the distance problem common in 
geographically distributed groups has not been sufficient to cause misunderstandings in 
communication (Niazi et al., 2016). It is also reasonable to assume that the flow of knowledge 
that has been transferred over time through work packages between client and vendor team has 
not been so rapid such that vendor team members have been unable to learn and assimilate their 
new experiences of the client environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In other words, the 
stock of knowledge assets in the vendor team has been accumulated at a pace that has not led to 
performance problems (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
However, with increasing numbers of open items, but still a balance between planned and 
completed work packages, we interpret a moderate level of knowledge at risk. Likewise, with 
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low numbers of open items, but a positive difference between the numbers of planned and 
complete work packages (i.e., more planned work packages in a given week than completed 
ones), we interpret moderate knowledge at risk. In these situations, client knowledge has been 
articulated in the form of work package requests but decisions are made to postpone them (in the 
case of increasing open items) or to start them but then incurring delays (in the case of planned 
work exceeding completed work). Here, a significant volume of work packages has been 
codified but the vendor team is not able to absorb the work. According to the principle of 
postponement (Bucklin, 1965), there is a “shifting of risk forward to the buyer” (Bucklin, 1965: 
27) when a supplier cannot fulfil an order. In our case, we argue that vendor postponement shifts 
risk forward to the client in the form of increasing client knowledge at risk; there is increased 
dependency on the vendor in the short term (Quélin and Duhamel, 2003; Adeleye et al., 2004), 
and, as noted below, potential for loss of client productivity (Ahmad et al., 2014), and reduced 
client competitiveness (Hoecht and Trott, 2006b) because the individuals from the client side 
involved in writing the work packages are themselves under threat of being relocated away from 
the project or made redundant as part of the offshoring strategy. Finally, and extending the 
previous logic, in situations where there is a high number of open items running concurrently 
with a positive difference between planned and complete tasks, we interpret a high level of 
knowledge at risk. We assume that the flow of knowledge through the codified work packages 
has been too fast for the vendor team members to learn effectively (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
The vendor’s stock of knowledge assets concerning the client organization, systems and 
commercial environment has not been accumulated efficiently (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Mishra 
and Mahanty, 2016) and they are not able to perform to a level expected of them by the client. 
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We examined the description of work packages that were in open status. These included 
work items related to performance tuning, optimization of database indices, improving the way 
data was integrated and aggregated, automation of ‘feeds’ of data between systems, mechanisms 
for reformatting data, tests to new upgrades for graphical user interfaces and certain types of 
documentation for client use. Both technical knowledge underlying these requests as well as the 
business rationale for them was knowledge that was held by non-vendor technical experts within 
the client organization. These individuals faced the prospect of role re-deployment (to another 
part of the client organization) or redundancy as per the stated goal of the offshore outsourcing 
arrangement. Postponing these work packages at a time where the individuals with the technical 
and business knowledge underpinning the work packages were themselves at risk of leaving the 
project constitutes a situation of knowledge at risk according to our definition. In other words, it 
becomes more likely (as opposed to less likely) that knowledge of what can contribute to 
competitive advantage for the client will be lost (Ahmad et al., 2014). It becomes more likely (as 
opposed to less likely) that there will be a loss of client productivity (Ahmad et al., 2014), 
reduced client competitiveness (Hoecht and Trott, 2006b) and poor responsiveness to market 
changes (Bhali and Rivard, 2005; Gewald and Dibbern, 2009). 
 
 
Results 
Identifying Transition Phases 
Our first finding is that the transition period is a non-linear process of knowledge transfer and 
increasing take-up of responsibility by the vendor’s offshore team. This process is split by a 
decision point in time we refer to as the ‘ramp-up’ point. This is the point in time at which the 
decision has been taken for a complete take-over of ownership for the core knowledge-intensive 
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activity by the vendor team, and arguably represents the most important decision during the 
transition. In our case, and unlike Kotlarsky et al. (2014) and Tiwari (2009) which were much 
earlier, this ramp-up point occurred at the start of the third year of the transition. Prior to the 
ramp-up point, we note an initial penetration and settling into the client- and project-specific 
technology and business context by the vendor team. Four phases of the transition are identified, 
the main characteristics of which are summarized in Table 2. The phases are defined and 
delineated by a significant change to the team composition, including the offshore team leader, 
as indicated to us by the vendor.  
 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 HERE *** 
 
In the penetration phase, offshore vendor resources were introduced into the project for the first 
time (in this case less than 30% of total team composition), an onshore placement from the 
offshore vendor was established and physically located in the client team, regular status reports 
were set up for articulating the vendor’s understanding of work requests and offshore team 
output. The majority of programming work was, however, still carried out by the client team.  
According to our key informant on the client side of the project, in the penetration phase: 
“When the team is just starting up then issues may arise due to poor understanding of client 
requirements, due to lack of face-to-face interactions and different styles of communication and 
this issue is magnified if there is little on-shore resource from offshore vendor” (client project 
manager). 
 
Vendor engineers also noted a lack of communication from the client in this phase: 
“We get very few feedbacks/comments from the client expressing their happiness or complaints 
about the deliverables or quality of work” (a vendor engineer). 
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In the embedment phase, the offshore composition of around 30% was maintained. However, this 
phase was distinct from the previous phase in two key respects: (1) while the majority of 
complex development tasks were still performed by client development staff the client decided 
that an increasing number of these more advanced tasks should be assigned to the vendor team, 
and (2) high performing vendor team members were identified and hand-picked to be placed 
onshore with a key role of acting as coordination points between client project management and 
vendor personnel.  According to our key informant on the client side, in the embedment phase: 
“The offshore vendor maintained a ‘bench’ where [a] talent pool was kept to mitigate risk of 
staff turnovers and also ability to deploy high performing individuals to profitable projects, the 
offshore team tried to keep to the schedule by putting extra hours” (client project manager). 
 
One of the offshore engineers noted how the vendor team came under increasing scrutiny from 
the client as increasingly complex work packages were assigned to them: 
 “Key challenge …. is, [the] client is always look for more visibility in offshore work” (sic) (a 
vendor engineer). 
 
In the ramp-up phase the decision was made to assign a majority of development tasks (as 
opposed to a minority fraction) to be undertaken offshore by the vendor. This phase was different 
to the previous phase in three ways: (1) the client team became completely dependent on the 
vendor team in order to satisfy work requests; the client team no longer had sufficient resources 
to carry out the core activity that the vendor team was brought in to undertake (i.e., software 
development), (2) over 50% of the combined team was made up from offshore vendor staff for 
the first time, and a re-allocation or termination of employment for onshore client staff engaged 
in software coding was started; remaining client staff re-focused on work scheduling, throughput 
control and quality checking, and an increase in the number of vendor staff were deployed 
onshore to the client’s offices, (3) the offshore team was encouraged to undertake a broader 
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scope of tasks in the software life-cycle beyond coding. These included writing task 
specifications, integration testing and user documentation. 
Our key informant on the client side of the project raised the following issue from the 
client’s perspective in the ramp-up phase, highlighting the importance of onshore coordination as 
the dependency on the vendor increases: 
“If all the technical resources are based offshore, then there is a missing bridge between the 
project manager and technical team when there is no onshore coordinator who can dissipate 
client needs to the technical staff in their ‘language’” (client project manager). 
 
Extending this, a vendor engineer noted how the vendor team had taken on more advanced roles 
(e.g., the “chief architect” role) that were based onshore and interfaced directly with the client: 
“Our onshore team consists of chief architects and they directly interface with the client 
regularly while we as offshore unit serve to our onshore team.” (a vendor engineer) 
 
Finally, in what we label the stabilization phase, the following distinctive features were 
observed: (1) the decision was made for an increase to over 70% of the team being made up of 
offshore vendor staff, (2) all software development work was conducted using vendor resources 
for the first time, and client team members were responsible for capturing and articulating 
requirements from the client business organization, communicating and requesting estimates for 
work, prioritizing and scheduling work and monitoring performance and quality checking of 
deliverables, (3) the non-coding work now being conducted by the offshore vendor team was 
maintained and this became a core activity of that part of the team. According to our key 
informant on the client side of the project, the stabilization phase had the highest level of 
dependency on the vendor although this was offset with an optimal balance of rotated staff: 
“A near-100% off-shore software development model is risky and finding the right onshore – 
offshore mix is critical for the team’s success and continuous and consistent quality 
deliverables” (client project manager). 
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A vendor engineer also made reference to turnover of vendor staff in this phase where 
dependency of the client on the vendor is at its peak: 
“How well we manage the replacement of an experienced existing person with new person 
without affecting the client business is important” (a vendor engineer). 
 
Variance in Knowledge at Risk over Time 
The second main finding relates to evidence that knowledge at risk varies relative to the decision 
to enter the ramp-up phase, and is at its highest during the embedment phase. Tables 3 and 4 
show how volumes of planned, completed and open items changed pre- and post-ramp-up. T-
tests show the mean number of work items planned and completed by the offshore team per 
week to be significantly higher post ramp-up (p<0.001). The backlog distribution of open items 
is not significantly different between pre and post ramp-up. ANOVA tests by phase support the 
identification of the four distinct phases: post-hoc Scheffe’s test reveals the four groups to be 
distinct for both planned tasks (F=168.40, p<0.001) and completed tasks (F=264.62, p<0.001). 
For open items, the ANOVA test reveals homogeneity between phases two, three and four.  
 
*** INSERT TABLES 3 & 4 HERE *** 
 
Figure 1 shows eight week moving averages for all coded tasks, along with the emerging phases 
during the transition period. The overall volume of work packages handled by the offshore 
vendor team increases over time, with the peak performance being in phase 3: ramp-up, when the 
decision was made to direct all coding activity to the offshore team. During this phase the 
volume of planned and completed tasks grows initially in tandem, but then planned tasks drop in 
advance of completed tasks, with the net effect of a gap re-emerging between planned and 
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completed tasks (Figure 1). Figure 2 depicts another view on the data, showing the vendor team 
task throughput over the four years (completed – planned tasks) relative to the ramp-up point. 
This pre-ramp up pattern resembles a “go-stop” cycle as caused by absorption constraints within 
time compression diseconomies theory (Cool et al., 2012). Table 2 indicates how offshore team 
lead had limited experience in the current project during this phase, although they did have 
onshore experience with the client in a separate project. 
 
*** INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2 HERE *** 
 
The mean of planned and completed tasks per week (Table 4) confirms the ramp-up phase had 
the highest throughput in terms of numbers of work packages executed: the means are higher in 
the ramp-up phase than in any other phase. Furthermore, there was a larger offshore vendor team 
and team lead responsibilities became shared between two people. The two people running the 
vendor team in this phase had gained over 18 months onshore experience with the client on the 
current project (Table 2). This changed set-up managed to reduce the backlog during the ramp-
up phase, with the number of open items reducing to zero during the fourth year. In terms of the 
difference in planned and completed tasks, the rate of change of this is significantly higher post 
ramp-up than pre ramp-up (t=4.687, p<0.001) and (t=4.784, p<0.001) respectively. According to 
the ANOVA and post-hoc Scheffe’s test, these differences were at their mean highest during the 
immediate post ramp-up phase (F=16.764, p<0.001) and (F=16.324, p<0.001) respectively. 
Quotes from our key informants provide additional insight into why work packages were 
delayed prior to ramp-up, and how they were brought down after ramp-up. According to the 
client project manager, prior to ramp-up, and despite the vendor’s use of a ‘bench’: 
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“… quality of delivery was an issue due to sometimes use of junior team members who did not 
understand the criticality of particular features or lacked necessary data analysis skills to 
identify complex data issues or data scenarios” (client project manager). 
 
However, concerns were seen on both sides: vendor engineers also lamented, that prior to ramp-
up: 
“The on-site /off-shore communication is not so effective.  We, at off-shore do not know the status 
of the deliverable once it is delivered to on-site” (a vendor engineer) 
 
Post ramp-up, the client project manager pointed to the importance of an expanded set of 
capabilities within the vendor team. This did not only involve locating vendor staff onshore with 
“chief architect” responsibility (as noted above), it also involved establishing and embedding a 
testing capability offshore: 
“Someone onshore must perform a round of testing before the user acceptance tests else there is 
serious risk that the user may discover few basic functionalities which may erode clients’ 
confidence in the software” (client project manager). 
 
Meanwhile, a vendor engineer pointed to the continued use of a bridge in the onshore location 
for the effective functioning of the team post ramp-up: 
“on-site person act as a bridge and this is a very important / critical role for the success of the 
project / application” (a vendor engineer). 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The present study provides new insight into the transition phase in IS offshore outsourcing 
(Tiwari, 2009; Beulen et al., 2011) by examining how ongoing decisions with implications for 
knowledge at risk can change over time as the offshore outsourcing arrangement unfolds. One 
type of decision is at the team level, and relates to the overall composition of the team, how 
many staff are located onshore and who is leading the team (Table 2). These types of decisions 
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occur relatively infrequently and set the overall structure for international project work over 
many months, sometimes years. Another type of decision we find is at the work package level 
(Figure 1). There is a one-to-many relationship between a project status report and work 
packages. Decisions are made by the vendor team to ‘accept’ a new work package for scheduling 
(we capture this as a ‘planned’ status). As we also found out, decisions are made by the vendor 
team to put certain work packages into an ‘open’ status, unable to be scheduled. This level of 
decision making occurs on an ongoing basis and is reported in weekly status reports. Our 
approach departs from prior research on transitions in offshore outsourcing and use hard project 
status data over a four-year period to gain insight into client – vendor engagement at team-level 
and augment this with data from the vendor on the team composition, as well as comments from 
both the vendor and client sides. Our study provides greater depth of insight into the transition 
period than previous work that looks at whole waves of capability transfer (e.g., Kotlarsky et al., 
2014). While we do see continuity of the project transfer from client to vendor, we also see 
markedly different characteristics across the phases, not just in terms of decisions made about 
team structure and organization (which supports Tiwari (2009)) (Table 2), but also in terms of 
different patterns of completed, planned and on-hold work packages (Figures 1 and 2) (which 
extends the contributions of Tiwari (2009) and Beulen et al. (2011)). Results suggest knowledge 
at risk varies according to the amount of codified knowledge that the client attempts to pass over 
to the vendor in a given time period, relative to the vendor’s readiness and ability to absorb and 
utilize this knowledge as the client intended, i.e., the absorption constraints. These client 
attempts at transferring knowledge are ongoing decisions at the level of the individual work 
package within a given team, and depending on the complexity of the requests and the absorption 
constraints of the vendor team, they are met with varying levels of resistance over time. 
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Our analysis extends the body of literature concerned with risks in offshore outsourcing 
(e.g., Willcocks et al., 1999; Hoecht and Trott, 2006a) by putting a spotlight on the role played 
by the compression of activity over time, rather than solely over various forms of international 
distance and various client and vendor capabilities (Lacity et al., 2016). Our study suggests that 
theory of time-compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Cool et al., 2012; Chen et 
al., 2012) has a useful place in the field of research on IS offshore outsourcing, in particular 
concerning how decisions are made that impact knowledge flows and the extent to which client 
firms become exposed to liabilities that did not exist before the offshore outsourcing contract 
began (the pre-ramp-up downward slope in Figure 2 would not have occurred in a captive and 
co-located model). The analysis also extends work on decision-making in offshore outsourcing 
by shedding light on subsequent, ongoing decisions that take place at team level following the 
initial decision to enter into an offshore outsourcing arrangement with a vendor in a specific 
location (Chadee and Raman, 2009; Liang et al., 2016).  
The case highlights how, during the transition period, teams from both the client and 
vendor firms need to adapt and re-construct their roles (which supports Tiwari (2009)), but that 
their learning and performance will not remain constant. While we provide some support to 
previous studies that suggest an optimal performance in an offshore outsourced team is not 
possible to achieve quickly (Beulen et al., 2011; Martinez-Noya et al., 2013; O’Donoghue and 
Croasdell, 2009), our findings extend this literature by highlighting a critical decision in terms of 
the decision to enter a ‘ramp-up’ phase; the juncture of this point can be used to dramatically 
alter the extent to which knowledge at risk is present within the project. Moreover, our findings 
contribute to the recent focus on transition management capability (Lacity et al., 2016) vis-à-vis 
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the capabilities need by both parties to facilitate the decision to enter the all-important ‘ramp-up’ 
phase.  
We believe that a more careful treatment of the role played by points in time such as this 
can expand on recent work that integrates knowledge management and risk management (e.g. 
Trkman and Desouza, 2012; Massingham, 2010; Neef, 2005). The subject of knowledge at risk 
refers to how knowledge and its transfer between senders and receivers can constitute a liability 
from the perspective of the party disseminating the knowledge. In the worst case the latter 
relinquishes its “capacity for effective action or decision making in a specific organizational 
context” (DeLong, 2004, p. 21). In contrast to knowledge leakage, which is “the extent to which 
the focal firm's private knowledge is intentionally appropriated by or unintentionally transferred 
to partners” (Jiang et al., 2013, p. 984) (i.e., the actual loss of knowledge); knowledge at risk 
occurs in a time period before that loss and within a sequence of decisions made by participating 
firms. Given this definition of knowledge at risk, we believe that practitioners can benefit by 
examining how key events within the organizational context of knowledge transfer transpire over 
time. In our case, we see signs of an ‘amplified’ knowledge at risk during the embedment phase 
– a period in which the vendor team struggles to keep up with increasingly complex client 
requests, and a dampening of knowledge at risk after the ramp-up point – when the vendor team 
is able to finally get a handle on client requests. It also stresses that the different phases of 
transition call for different approaches to managing knowledge at risk. Thus firms will need to 
hone their knowledge management capabilities for offshore outsourcing (Ranganathan and 
Balaji, 2007) according to the specific phase within the transition period in which a given project 
finds itself. We join others (e.g., Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007; Lacity et al., 2016) who call for 
further research on development of capabilities for operational execution that go beyond human 
32 
resource management and that also include recognizing the dynamic nature of such capabilities 
over time. 
From a managerial perspective, our study suggests client firms need to be aware that 
project teams engaged in offshore outsourcing will undergo a time-compressed learning process 
in which both client and vendor teams will need to dynamically develop new capabilities for 
managing knowledge at risk. As others have noted, client teams will need to improve their 
cultural competence, socialization and communication capabilities over time, aspects commonly 
seen as rooted in the various forms of international distance between client and vendor (Cheng et 
al., 2016; Niazi et al., 2016). But they will also need to develop skills in assessing the balance 
between work package requests on the one hand and vendor absorption constraints on the other. 
This balance will inform decisions about increasing the complexity of tasks for the vendor to 
work on. Without an understanding of this balance, our study suggests work requests will end up 
postponed, and the gap between planned and completed work will grow larger. Clients will need 
to find ways to understand vendor absorptive capacity over time and evaluate the constraints on 
which vendors can process new work. Vendor firms, likewise, need to be aware that a project-
level transition is a process of learning in which expertise and knowledge flow from client to 
vendor staff organized in teams. There may be periods of time during a transition in which a 
vendor team is able to assimilate, internalize and act on client knowledge in ways in which the 
client expects. Conversely, there may be other periods of time in which the vendor team’s ability 
to process new client knowledge is hindered. Vendors should be sensitive to this, as it will signal 
increasing knowledge at risk from the perspective of the client, with potentially negative 
consequences for the longer term client – vendor relationship. Understanding the consequences 
of ongoing decision-making in terms of knowledge at risk in different phases of an offshore 
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outsourcing transition can lead to a better allocation of resources within the project management 
framework. Vendors should prepare their teams for the possibility of needing to respond to the 
issue of client knowledge at risk, at least in certain phases of a transition with new clients, and 
they should be ready to inform and influence clients that more malleable joint-team structures 
with an appropriate fit between task content, communications and socialization be considered to 
minimize the likelihood of knowledge at risk arising. The findings also point to the usefulness of 
having project management systems that identify and report on knowledge at risk during IS 
offshore outsourcing through all the phases of the transition. We believe ‘hard’ project status 
data, such as that used in the current analysis is extremely useful for this. 
Future work can address the limitations of our study as well as investigate new questions 
that arise as a consequence of our analysis. In terms of limitations, firstly, our study is based on a 
single offshore outsourcing arrangement. The dynamics of ongoing decision making in the 
current case may be different from the dynamics in other offshoring agreements in different 
industries or involving different companies and countries. Future research could compare and 
contrast accumulation of resources and project status data across different projects, such as 
projects in which transitions were ‘rushed’ versus ones that were deliberately executed at a 
slower pace. Secondly, our research design utilized the perspective of the vendor team. While the 
vendor’s project status reports represented the result of cooperative work between client and 
vendor, and the work packages reported were originally specified by the client, not the vendor, 
additional insights still could be gained by more explicitly including the perspective of both 
parties, including a comparison between client plan and expectation for the overall transition 
phase with the reality of what actually happened. This would be useful as it could illuminate the 
actual decision process in terms of how stakeholders interacted and what information they used 
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when deciding which work packages to submit to the vendor and when. Thirdly, while we 
examined important decisions made by the client during the transition period, we were not able 
to capture every type of decision. Future work can explore the micro-level decision making 
processes within these transitions. Fourthly, we made an assumption that the presence and 
severity of knowledge at risk in IS offshore outsourcing can be established by examining 
changes in the number of open work items and changes in the difference between planned and 
completed work items over time. We did not identify or capture alternative determinants of this 
effect1 or other adverse consequences (such as worsening client market performance or erosion 
of shareholder value) and link these to the concept of knowledge at risk over time. Finally, we 
did not examine how the congruence between type of interpersonal ties, the nature of knowledge, 
the organizations and their characteristics contributes to the effectiveness of knowledge transfer 
in offshore outsourcing arrangements.  
Future research could address these issues with alternative research methods and data 
collection instruments. Furthermore, we believe there are new research avenues that can build on 
the present study. For instance, there is merit for future research to pursue longitudinal studies of 
both tacit and explicit knowledge dynamics in offshore outsourcing arrangements to establish 
how problems of time-compression diseconomies may occur between these fundamental types of 
knowledge. Future research could also examine scenarios in which ongoing decisions (such as 
when to invoke the ramp-up point) are either brought-forward or postponed to see the impact that 
different timings will have on ultimate performance. Another question that could be explored is 
how different forms of client-vendor distance (geographic, administrative, cultural, economic) 
interact with time-compression variables such as absorption constraints in explaining knowledge 
                                                 
1 As Welch, Rumyantseva and Hewerdine (2016: 126) argue, case research needs to be “alert to what a concept 
obscures as well as illuminates”  
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transfer. Referring to recent work on capabilities in offshore outsourcing (Ranganathan and 
Balaji, 2007; Lacity et al., 2016), future research may also focus on the development of offshore 
outsourcing skills over time aimed at decision making under knowledge at risk. We hope the 
current study can open the path for researchers to investigate knowledge at risk in international 
IS projects involving multiple parties and to use exploratory research designs that capture the 
changing nature of decision-making over time. 
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Table 1 – Relevance of Selected Literature on Knowledge at Risk to Offshore Outsourcing 
 
Key question Subject of analysis Contributions 
1. What types of 
knowledge are at 
risk? 
- proprietary, private and confidential information 
 
- diffusion of best practice 
 
- know-how, competencies, critical resources, capabilities and IP 
 
 
 
 
- relationship knowledge (relational/social capital) 
 
- key areas of expertise 
- commercially sensitive information 
- knowledge of how tasks, business units or functions are connected 
- Currie et al., 2008; Raiborn et al., 2009; 
Ahmad et al., 2014 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006b; Baccara, 
2007 
- Willcocks et al., 1999; Quélin and 
Duhamel, 2003; Hoecht and Trott, 
2006b; Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007; 
Gewald and Dibbern, 2009; Chou and 
Chou, 2009 
- Quélin and Duhamel, 2003; Adeleye et 
al., 2004 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006a 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006a 
- Bahli and Rivard, 2005 
 
2. How could this 
knowledge be put 
at risk during a 
transition period? 
- close relationship between the partners 
- purposeful acts of betrayal 
- accidental disclosure 
- Baccara, 2007 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006b 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006b 
3. What is the 
potential impact 
of knowledge at 
risk on clients 
during offshore 
outsourcing? 
- increased dependency on vendor (the client becomes "locked-in") 
 
 
 
 competitive advantage becomes more dependent on vendors 
 ex-post exploitation because of asset specificity 
 relatedness, i.e. the performance of one piece of work depends on the completion of 
other pieces of work 
 
- reduced quality concerning the outsourced business activity 
 
 
- loss of productivity and/or innovativeness 
- decreased reputation: company´s goodwill is endangered 
 
 
- increased financial costs 
- Willcocks et al., 1999; Quélin and 
Duhamel, 2003; Adeleye et al., 2004; 
Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama, 2006; 
Chou and Chou, 2009 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006a 
- Bahli and Rivard, 2005 
- Bahli and Rivard, 2005; Belcourt, 2006 
 
 
-  Quélin and Duhamel, 2003; Bahli and 
Rivard, 2005; Belcourt, 2006; Currie et 
al., 2008; Gewald and Dibbern, 2009 
- Ahmad et al., 2014 
- Adeleye et al., 2004; Bahli and Rivard, 
2006; Currie et al., 2008; Gewald and 
Dibbern, 2009; Ahmad et al., 2014  
- Adeleye et al., 2004 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006a, 2006b 
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Key question Subject of analysis Contributions 
- reduced competitiveness: loss of future ability to innovate and compete in fast-moving and 
unpredictable markets 
- degradation from leading edge expertise to industry standard 
- loss of absorptive capacity required to recognize and exploit new business opportunities 
- loss of revenue and reduced capacity to generate profits  
 
- strengthening of existing competitors or development of new competitors 
- knowledge base is endangered – risk of forgoing the development of the knowledge base 
 
 
 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006a 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006a 
- Belcourt, 2006; Raiborn et al., 2009; 
Ahmad et al., 2014 
- Belcourt, 2006; Baccara, 2007 
- Hoecht and Trott, 2006a, 2006b 
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Table 2 – Chronological Structure and Key Decisions during the Transition Period 
Key Decision 
Pre Ramp-up Post Ramp-up 
Interpretation Phase 1: 
Penetration 
(8 months) 
Phase 2:  
Embedment 
(17 months) 
Phase 3: 
Ramp-up 
(15 months) 
Phase 4: 
Stabilization 
(8 months) 
Decision on 
client onshore 
team (% of 
combined client-
vendor team) 
>70% >70% <50% <30% 
Becoming 
increasingly focused 
on remote team 
management, quality 
monitoring and 
performance 
improvement of the 
offshore team 
Decision on 
vendor offshore 
team (% of 
combined team) 
and principal 
responsibility 
<30% 
Coding 
<30% 
Coding 
>50% 
Task 
specifications, 
coding, user 
documentation 
>70% 
Task 
specifications, 
coding, user 
documentation 
Becoming 
increasingly 
responsible for 
knowledge-intensive 
work and action, 
including 
internalization of 
tacit knowledge 
Decision on 
extent of staff 
rotation 
Little 
rotation of 
offshore 
vendor staff 
Increasing on-
/offshore 
rotation; 
Introduction of 
quarterly video 
conferences and 
weekly 
teleconferences 
Highest level of 
on-/offshore 
rotation; 
rotation of 
junior members 
during periods 
of vacation and 
absence 
Decreasing level 
of on-/offshore 
rotation; face-
to-face visits by 
client managers 
to offshore 
teams 
Increasing cultural 
competence and 
understanding of the 
client’s business 
issues 
Decision on 
offshore team 
leader(s) 
Single leader 
with little 
onshore or 
client 
experience 
but generic 
skills in 
project 
technology 
Single leader 
with moderate 
onshore client 
experience (but 
in a separate 
project) and 
generic skills in 
project 
technology 
Multiple leaders 
who were 
present in both 
previous 
phases: in-depth 
onshore 
experience with 
client and 
specific skills in 
project 
technology 
Single leader 
with significant 
onshore client 
experience and 
specific skills in 
project 
technology 
Team leader’s 
increasing ability to 
make 
recommendations to 
client and attempt to 
innovate for client 
Interpretation of 
knowledge at risk 
Low: no 
open items 
and tasks 
completed 
exceed tasks 
planned 
Moderate -> 
High: increasing 
open items and 
shift towards 
more planned 
tasks than 
completed 
Moderate -> 
Low: reduction 
in open items 
and shift 
towards 
completed tasks 
exceeding 
planned 
Low: no open 
items and 
resolution of 
planned tasks 
exceeding 
completed 
Client knowledge at 
risk highest in the 
embedment phase, 
pre-ramp-up 
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Table 3 – Comparison of Status Data Pre- and Post- Ramp-up 
 
 Pre Ramp-up Decision  Post Ramp-up Decision t-test (equal 
variances not 
assumed) Indicator N 
Mean per week 
(s.d.) 
N 
Mean per week 
(s.d.) 
Tasks planned 106 7.51 (3.39) 75 15.93 (3.72) -15.557*** 
Tasks completed 106 8.39 (2.62) 75 19.53 (5.15) -17.224*** 
Open items 79 6.77 (4.43) 43 7.00 (1.93) -0.394 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
 
 
Table 4 – ANOVA by Phase 
 
 Pre Ramp-up Decision Post Ramp-up Decision 
F statistic 
Post-hoc 
(Scheffe’s 
test) Indicator 
Penetration 
N / Mean 
(s.d.) 
Embedment 
N / Mean (s.d.) 
Ramp-up 
N / Mean 
(s.d.) 
Stabilization 
N / Mean 
(s.d.) 
Tasks planned 
30 / 3.77 
(1.74) 
79 / 9.01 
(2.64) 
33 / 17.70 
(4.03) 
39 / 14.92 
(2.49) 
168.40*** 1,2,4,3 
Tasks completed 
30 / 5.90 
(1.423) 
79 / 9.38 
(2.31) 
33 / 23.18 
(4.34) 
39 / 17.21 
(3.27) 
264.62*** 1,2,4,3 
Open items 
13 / 0.38 
(0.506) 
69 / 7.96 
(3.64) 
33 / 7.42 
(1.99) 
7 / 5.29 
(0.49) 
24.96*** 1, (4,3,2) 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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Figure 1 – Longitudinal Project Status Data and Team Composition 
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Figure 2 – Longitudinal View of Vendor Team Task Throughput 
 
 
Ramp-up Point 
Time (Years) 
1 2 3 4 
